David Petraeus and the COIN strategy

David Petraeus has one of the most difficult jobs in the world.

After the resignation of his predecessor in June, Petraeus has taken on the role of Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

So who is this man that President Obama has so much faith in, why was he given this role, and what is his strategy?

The war in Afghanistan began in 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established in that same year, and is currently comprised of 120,000 troops from 47 nations.

Its stated goals are to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, improve governance and socio-economic development, and provide stability.

Until June, command of ISAF was in the hands of Stanley McChrystal. He prompted his own resignation by making loose comments about government officials to a reporter, which were later published in Rolling Stone magazine.

His replacement, David Petraeus, is known as “the most competitive man on earth.”

He is often public about his visions: “Committing to a goal publicly puts pressure on oneself; it becomes an enormous action-forcing mechanism and often helps you achieve more than you would have had you kept your goals to yourself.”

During 2007 and 2008 he successfully led the war effort in Iraq that saw a 90% reduction in violence.

And from 2008 until his post in Afghanistan, Petraeus was the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the headquarters responsible for military operations in 20 countries.

These operations include ‘Iraqi Freedom’ and ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Iraq, as well as operations in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Petraeus is committed to the same counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy implemented in Afghanistan by McChrystal.

COIN integrates military and civilian counterinsurgency activities, and is based on the theory that military operations alone are not enough to defeat an insurgency.

The process of COIN has three objectives: first, the enemy must be cleared from the target area; second, the enemy must be kept out; and third, infrastructure and government must develop to empower the civilians of the region.

As Petraeus helped write in the Field Manual, “Success in COIN operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people.”

With the ultimate goal being to ensure that Afghanistan doesn’t become a safe haven for terrorists, most experts agree COIN is the best strategy.

But this region by region process takes a long time, and requires a high number of troops.

For this reason, Petraeus intends to increase troop numbers in Afghanistan. This objective could be difficult to achieve as congressional enthusiasm for the war continues to diminish.

Last year President Obama stated that US troops will begin to withdrawal in July 2011. But Petraeus stresses that this date merely marks the beginning of the process, with some functions being transferred to the Afghans.

Popular support is thought crucial to a successful counterinsurgency. Therefore, a central theme of COIN is winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of local populations.

To help achieve this goal, strict rules of engagement have been developed which aim to protect innocent civilians and minimise casualties.

These rules restrict soldiers’ ability to use force and therefore lessen accidents between military forces and civilians. But they can be dangerous to implement in practice. ISAF troops have often complained about the lack of self-protection that these rules afford them.

Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen was asked what it would cost and what it would take to carry out the original objectives in Afghanistan.

He said that in order to prevent an Al Qaeda sanctuary, protect the government from threats like the Taliban, build civil institutions, and then hand over power, the only option is to spend 10 to 15 more years there.

Kilcullen says that the war effort is at a fork in the road. NATO and the US can either put more troops in and carry out the original objectives, or scale back and focus simply on counter-terrorism – a merely short-term solution.

However, he advises that the two goals are interlinked, meaning you cannot do the counter-terrorism without a certain amount of governance, development, and negotiation.

Indeed, almost all successful counterinsurgencies have involved negotiation with the enemy.

And many countries seem to be reluctantly accepting that there will be a negotiated end to this war: As one official said, “perhaps the best that can be hoped for with the current efforts is to weaken the militants sufficiently to bring them to the table.”

The COIN tactics are a far cry from the ‘shock and awe’ campaigns used in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

However, the man in charge of military strategy in Afghanistan is committed to their potential.

In the words of Petraeus himself, “The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the centre of gravity. Only by providing them security and earning their trust and confidence can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail.”

By Josh Daniell